THE MIRROR EFFECT
IDENTITY AND MINORISATION AMONG THE QUECHUAS AND AMAZIGHS IN CATALONIA

Albert Badosa Roldós
PhD Candidate
School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics

ABSTRACT

The borders of minoritised communities and national minorities are different than the nation-state ones; they are affected by local dynamics, the nation-state framework, and the global English-dominant context. In this paper, I analyse the concepts of minorisation and identity in two minoritised migrant communities, the Quechua and the Amazigh, living in another minoritised community, Catalonia. I will evaluate double and triple minorisation and the mirror effect on these communities. Double or triple minorisation happens when a particular individual or population sector is affected by more than one type of discrimination (Parella, 2003). The mirror effect happens when a particular individual or community from a minoritised background establishes contact with another minoritised community, triggering a change of identity, and cultural and linguistic ideologies and representations (Cortès-Colomé, 2016). I will analyse a set of collected qualitative data, mainly semi-structured interviews with individuals from both communities residing in Barcelona. This is the first study to address these issues on minoritised communities in Catalonia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Albert Badosa Roldós is a PhD student in Linguistics at the School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics at SOAS. He completed the MA Language Documentation and Description programme also at SOAS, and a BA in Linguistics and Slavic Languages at the University of Barcelona. He is part of GLiDi (Grup de Lingüistes per la Diversitat) at this university. His interests include phonetics and phonology, sociolinguistics, minority languages, language revitalisation, language documentation, heritage languages, Vietic languages, and Slavic languages, among others.

THE CATALAN CONTEXT AND HYPOTHESES

This paper is part of a wider study that looks at the language ideologies of the Quechua and Amazigh communities in Catalonia, together with the factors affecting them: minorisation and the mirror effect. In this paper, I only focus on these two factors that shape the identity and the cultural, linguistic, and social practices of these communities within a stateless nation or minoritised nation context - Catalonia.

Catalonia is a country with a national conflict latent for centuries. This conflict is present in many spheres of daily life; in fact, it cannot be easily avoided. All three local languages in Catalonia are minoritised and subordinated to Spanish: Catalan Sign Language, Occitan/Aranese, and Catalan.

Language use data can be useful to understand this conflict, which is also - and some would say primarily - linguistic. Data from the Institute of Statistics of Catalonia shows that in only 10 years, use of the Catalan language dropped from 46% estimated in 2003 to the 36.%3 in 2013. Spanish remains the dominant language, with its use rising from 47.2% to 50.7% (EULC2003, 2005: EULP2013, 2015).

Nonetheless, the aforementioned languages are not the only languages spoken in Catalonia. Recent migration waves have changed substantially the demographics in Catalonia: between 2003 and 2013, alloglots - their first language (L1 onwards) is different from Occitan, Spanish or Catalan - have increased by 400,000 (DGPL, 2015:16). This means that 10.6% of the total Catalonian population has an initial language other than Catalan, Occitan or Spanish (EULP2013, 2015:30).

This numerous population increase has altered the sociolinguistic dynamics in Catalonia. From IDESCAT data, linguists have inferred that foreign populations integrate essentially in Spanish (DGPL, 2015:27,59). This has provoked an increase in mainly Spanish habitual speakers - 32.9% in 2003 to 35% in 2013 - and a decrease in mainly Catalan habitual speakers - 46.2% in 2003 to 41% in 2013 [1], (DGPL, 2015:39).

All these data account for an interesting situation, where there is a subordinated declining language, Catalan, which is related to the middle class [2] (Pujolar, 2009:91) and is present in domains normally reserved for dominant languages, such as mass media, high culture, or politics, and with an evident presence in the public space (DGPL, 2015:51).

In this scenario, the research focuses on what happens when communities who also come from a minoritised background move to Catalonia. Having evaluated the situation in Catalonia, I hypothesise that (1) a phenomenon called mirror effect is triggered from the contact between the local and the migrant communities, making the minoritised migrant communities revaluate their sociolinguistic assumptions.

Secondly, (2) both migrant communities face double and triple minorisation or discrimination: one from the fact of being a minority community in their original nation-states, and the other from being a nonprivileged migrant community in Catalonia. I will explain both phenomena in the next section.

[1] Data concerning population who has lived in Catalonia for at least 15 years.
[2] Spanish tends to be related to the working class but also the language of power.

THE QUECHUA AND AMAZIGH COMMUNITIES IN CATALONIA

The Quechuas and the Amazighs are considered minoritised peoples in their countries of origin. Their own languages are widely spoken despite the situation: Quechua with around 12 million speakers (Fidalgo, 2015:95, Lamuela, 2005:1-2; see Boukous, 2011; El Aissati, 2001; Múrcia and Zenia, 2016 for the Amazigh sociolinguistic situation) and Amazigh with around 10 million people (Gràcia, 2010:1-2; see Kendall and Hornberger, 2004; Moseley, 2010 for the Quechua sociolinguistic situation).

Although nation-state policies make it difficult to number minority groups, there have been attempts to estimate the number of speakers of the community language. In Catalonia, there is a large number of both Amazighs and Quechuas, although it is very difficult to count people from allochthonous, minoritised backgrounds due to hiding, lack of prestige, and other issues problematised in Comellas et al. (2010).

The Moroccan nationality is the largest immigrant community in Catalonia (more than 240,000), representing more than 20% of the overall immigrant population. At first, the host country expected the Moroccan immigrants to speak only Arabic, but most of them speak Amazigh. Between 50% and 80% of the Moroccan population in Catalonia are L1 Amazigh speakers. There are also some Amazigh speakers among the Algerian community (around 9,000). Some authors presume that Amazigh is in fact the third-most spoken language in Catalonia (Barrieras, 2013:9-10).

Ecuador is the third-largest nationality in Catalonia, with around 50,000 people; Peru and Bolivia are the homeland of around 20,000 respectively (Barrieras, 2013:2). However, Latin Americans in Spain can obtain Spanish nationality with just two years of residence, so these numbers are likely to be much higher (Alarcón and Garzón, 2011:45). We can probably assume that there must be thousands of Quechua speakers in Catalonia.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The mirror effect was first spotted and described by the Research Group on Endangered Languages (GELA-University of Barcelona) in Catalonia when surveying the no less than 300 different languages spoken across the country [3]. When interviewing some speakers of minority or less prestigious languages, they discovered that contact with a minority language - in this case Catalan - may act as a stimulus for some foreigners to revaluate their own cultural and linguistic heritages or even to reinterpret their language origins (Cortès-Colomé et al.: 2016:276). In fact, previous studies have suggested that contact with Catalan sometimes prompted a shift in language ideologies (Junyent et al.: 2011; Barrieras and Monrós, 2005), which made them coin the term mirror effect.

In the case of speakers of minority languages, this effect can make speakers revaluate the sociolinguistic situation of their languages and become cultural- and linguistic-engaged activists for the host minority language(s) and/or their heritage language(s) - in our case, Catalan Amazigh/Quechua.

The mirror effect projects the representation built in Catalonia onto their homeland and inspires a sense of solidarity among minoritised individuals. It is beneficial for heritage language maintenance and for having authentic social relationships in the local setting. Finally, the effect therefore triggers changes in linguistic representations, language attitudes, and behaviour (Cortès-Colomé et al.: 2016:275-281).

[3] http://www.gela.cat/doku.php?id=llengues [accessed April 2019]

Although it is not the main focus of this paper, I recurrently use the term language ideologies in relation to the mirror effect. Kathryn Woolard, one of the main authorities on language ideologies in Catalonia and beyond, defines them as being "representations, whether explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in a social world" (Woolard, 1998:20-21).

From her extensive sociolinguistic work in Catalonia, Woolard has coined two relevant concepts: authenticity and anonymity, used in the data analysis. According to her, "the ideology of authenticity credits a language variety with value insofar as it expresses the essential, distinctive nature of a community or a speaker, a view associated with Romantic particularism," whereas "the ideology of anonymity holds that a language is valuable as a neutral, objective vehicle of expression equally available to all users, a view associated with enlightenment universalism" (Woolard, 2008:304-306).

Although these studies have language as the main focus, identity and sociocultural practices also change along with language, as we will see in the following sections.

Along with language, the main focus of the previous studies mentioned, migration also shapes identity and sociocultural features, having a greater effect on minorities and prompting new forms of discrimination. Double minorisation is a concept that, grosso modo, can be understood as the condition suffered by an individual or a group characteristic of having elements from more than one minority. This term has been used in multiple languages and studied in multiple disciplines. Pandya (2013), for instance, addresses the effects of double minority status on Stereotype Threat and Heart Rate Variability. The author defines the *double minority effect* as "the psychological state created when two devalued identities interact to influence the individual in a way that is greater than the sum of the independent effects of those identities."

Kali'na language in the French Guiana is considered doubly minoritised not only for being subordinated to French and Creole languages, but also because their speakers are at the bottom of a socioracial stratification (Alby, 2005; Léglise and Alby, 2006). Mahele-Nyota (2010) considers double minorisation the case of migrant families with developmental handicaps. Gonzales et al. (2002), in turn, consider the combination of gender and ethnicity as a double minorisation condition, in this case regarding how Latino women do in task performance. This accumulation of minority traits is even called *triple minorisation* by authors such as Parella in her 2003 book *Mujer, immigrante y clase trabajadora: la triple discriminación* [*Woman, immigrant and working-class: the triple discrimination*].

Finally, in a similar case to ours, Dabène and Moore (2013) talk about a double minorisation feeling experienced by migrant children of minority background: Panjabi children in the UK learning Urdu and Sicilian children in Zurich or Algerians in France exposed to classical Arabic. They hold that the lack of prestige of these minority languages, linked to socioeconomic and legal conditions, is worsened in such cases.

Therefore, the research questions are on one hand to (1) evaluate how the mirror effect applies to the aforementioned communities and analyse how it changes their identities and sociocultural practices. On the other hand, I will evaluate (2) the applicability of the double or triple minorisation concept on the two communities and analyse its main features.

METHODOLOGY

This is a study grounded on quantitative and qualitative data taken in the summer of 2017 in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, Catalonia. In this paper, I will only present the qualitative data due to space constraints. Quantitative data was gathered through surveys asking for language ideologies using Likert scales, with 34 participants from the Quechua community and 48 from the Amazigh community.

The quantitative data is only supportive of the findings related to the first hypothesis on the mirror effect, as it does not tackle double minorisation issues. The author is aware of the little representativeness to make general claims about the double minorisation condition.

Two types of qualitative data were collected. The main data in which this study focuses are the 15 semistructured interviews to Amazigh and Quechua individuals, asking mainly about general profiles, backgrounds and language ideologies. Complementary data in the form of field notes from participatory observation were also collected, although it is not shown, again due to space constraints.

The participants of the interviews and participant observation sessions were contacted mainly through cultural Quechua/Amazigh associations, members of the University of Barcelona, journalists and researchers working with the communities, and Catalan language and culture associations. While a particular profile within the Amazigh community - cultural and political activists aware of their identity - was overrepresented in the qualitative data, the profiles of the Quechua participants were quite varied.

As a native Catalan speaker, I was aware of the influence of my presence on the data - the observer's paradox (Labov, 1972) or researcher's paradox (Sallabank, 2013). Before every interaction, I clarified my position, the basic goals of the study and tried to gain the confidence and trust of the interviewee.

One of the main issues was that, despite being born in Barcelona, I was otherised, especially by the Quechua community. I was seen as a nonracialised privileged man, sometimes as a sort of Catalan nationalist. This view affected my relationship with the participants and their responses, especially about Catalan, which was valued more positively when replying to direct questions. Related to otherisation was the choice of what language to speak to whom in every situation.

As reported in the introduction, language choice in Catalonia is sociopolitically loaded. After some hostile episodes towards Catalan, and despite my personal choice of always speaking in Catalan in Catalonia, I reached the conclusion that the most neutral language to speak with Quechuas was Spanish. I was able to use Catalan with Amazighs all the time; I perceived no special hostility and switched to Spanish only on a few occasions.

The tables below show the relation of the obtained qualitative data through interviews. The first table shows the naming convention for the semi-structured interviews, whereas the second one shows all the recorded interviews and their naming that will be quoted in the data analysis.

Q/A	Quechua community/Amazigh community
1/2/3…	Number of the interview time-ordered.
H/D	Gender of the participant: H–man/D–woman.
30/35/40…	Approximate age of the participant

Table 1: Naming convention for the semi-structured interviews.

A1H45	Q1D45(Bolivia)
A2H40	Q2H45(Peru)
A3D20	Q3D50(Peru)
A4H20	Q4H50(Equador)
A5D20 (A5D20S/A5D20H)	Q5D40(Peru)
A6H40	Q6H50(Peru)
A7D40	
A8D40	
A9H40	

Table 2: Semi-structured interviews.

DATA ANALYSIS: MIRROR EFFECT

The mirror effect was found in several individuals. Two out of the six Quechua interviewees present discourses that fit into the mirror effect phenomenon. Eight of nine Amazigh interviewees also fit into the category.

There are two cases of mirror effect among the Quechuas. Q6H50 already had a Quechua identity and sensibility towards his mother tongue, especially as a Quechua musician. Already in Catalonia, he felt that the situation of Catalan was similar to the Quechua one and felt the need to learn Catalan, use it, and promote and defend it as the autochthonous language. He also fights to include Quechua-related curriculum into public education.

> "[The Quechuas] feel identified, and then they make a comparison and say […] "it's our job/responsibility to rescue our tongue", and they identify [with the Catalan case]."**[4]**

Interviewee Q5D40 had a different experience. She had denied her roots, but when she got to Catalonia she realised she had to recover her Quechua identity and culture, an endeavour she carries on today. Like Q6H50, she defends plurilingualism, although she does not feel especially committed to Catalan, a language she "had to learn to integrate." However, she thanks Catalan society for triggering her mirror effect.

> Q5D40: 'But now I am recovering my language. Since I emigrated to Catalonia I was asking myself all the time. I was learning a language that everyone defends, because it is their identity and their language. And I was asking myself why I hadn't done anything for my language and my identity.'
>
> […]
>
> 'Catalan has awakened the need of learning my language and my customs again.'

[4] All quotations are translated from Catalan/Spanish.

Within the Amazigh community, there are also two major types of mirror effect: the ones who were already sensitive towards their minority heritage (A2H40, A6H40, A8D40 and A9H40) and the ones who developed this sensitivity once in Catalonia (A1H45, A3D20, A4H20 and A7D40). Interviewees from both groups point out that the first contact with Moroccan schooling, in Arabic, is a first shock and makes them question many issues.

> A6H40: 'It is true that there are people who never thought of it before, and once here, in the host society… they recognise themselves, they value themselves, and this is a bit shocking.'

> A4H20: '[School] is a big issue, and your Amazigh part, your history and cultural identity were not reflected in the educational system. Then you started questioning. Who am I?'

In the first case, the interviewees already started to identify themselves as Amazighs when they started to study in Moroccan universities and migrated from rural Amazigh areas to Arab-dominant cities. Their case shows how university, the Amazigh movement and Moroccan activism worked as a trigger to developing their engagement towards their minority language. Once in Catalonia, the mirror effect influences their identity and language practices, as they feel like Amazigh Catalans and use Catalan as their preferred language.

> A2H40: 'But the strongest awareness started at university. There I found the Amazighist faction. […] Then I realised that you are in your own country, your land, and they are denying what is yours and you have to give in to the dominant discourse!'

In the latter group, we find Amazighs who came to Catalonia as young children (A3D20, A4H20), and as they say, they could potentially have developed this sensibility had they grown up in Morocco. In Catalonia, and thanks to contact with other Amazighs and the Catalan situation, they have become defenders of the Amazigh language and culture and use Catalan as their preferred tongue. Interestingly, some of A4H20's siblings prefer Spanish and feel Spanish and Moroccan, whereas he and his older brother, due to the mirror effect feel Amazigh Catalan and use Catalan as their preferred language and identify with its situation.

> A4H20: 'So the oldest [sibling] and I are the ones who speak more in Catalan, the ones who live in Catalan, and the others more in Spanish. With their friends... in Spanish. Ever since [we lived in] Sant Andreu, the difference already came about, because I studied in a high school with more Catalan people and they had studied in one with more Spanish speakers, and from the beginning you can already feel it.'

There is also the case of A1H45, an Amazigh who only had the chance to have primary education and strongly identifies with the working class. His first contact with Catalan was in a support association in his host town and then he changed his language ideologies and linguistic representations towards both Amazigh and Catalan. He is an engaged activist for many causes, including immigration and Amazigh heritage culture, and the mirror effect may be the trigger or just be a part of his militancy.

> A1H45: 'I use Catalan in the Cornellà association. Some people use it. They are Catalan speakers. There is no Catalan-speaking working class, they all speak Spanish. The people with whom I speak Catalan are middle class: youths, students…'

Finally, there is the case of A7D40. She belongs to an upper-middle class, urban-Arabised Amazigh family who stopped transmitting Amazigh, and she is the only one in her family willing to recover her traditional identity and customs. Once in Barcelona, she started to identify herself as a Berber rather than a Moroccan. She is learning Catalan and has positive attitudes towards it as the autochthonous language of Catalonia.

> A7D40: 'I have recently started. When they ask me, I reply, "my origins are Berber, but I am from Morocco". Very recently. In my family they think I am crazy.'

DATA ANALYSIS: DOUBLE MINORISATION

From our fieldwork I found the following types of discrimination: (1) minorisation particular to migrant communities, (2) minorisation particular to minoritised communities, and (3) other universal minorisations, such as gender or religion. We can therefore talk about triple discrimination, using Parella's term (2003).

This cumulative minorisation affects differently both Amazigh and Quechua communities, and it is not perceived the same way by all interviewees. Some of them, mainly Quechuas, deny any kind of discrimination and claim to be comfortable in Catalonia. Some others like to denounce different kinds of discrimination suffered both in Catalonia and in their home countries. This is the case of Q5D40:

> 'Because they tell me I am whiter. But I am mestiza, I have an indigenous part. And I am proud of it and I don't like when they tell me I am whiter and less indigenous as a positive thing. It's true that when I was younger, I wanted to be whiter. The whiter the better. […] I have suffered discrimination. They have called me 'sudaca **[5]**'.'

After the mirror effect took place and she changed linguistic representations, she claimed to be able to free herself from racial and cultural discrimination:

> 'There is discrimination in our country but also here, and it must be addressed in both places, a lot of Catalan Peruvians must work on this. It took me many years. In the beginning, I was changing my clothing, the accent, to pretend to be from here, but it was fake. Now I am what I am and I accept myself.'

While this interviewee talks openly about discrimination and denounces it, other Quechuas deny it. Amazigh interviewees don't feel especially discriminated against in Catalonia, and although all of them can point to a couple of examples of it at play, they tend to minimise these events, probably because they identify with Catalan society or because they want to stress their integration:

> A5D20: 'Just today in the underground an old couple didn't want to sit next to us, even though there were free seats, and they preferred to stand. But it's a minority. But I think that to find a job it is a problem [because of the veil].'
>
> Researcher: 'Is there racism in Catalonia?'
>
> A5D20: 'Not racism, but they don't accept you the way you are.'

[5] A derogatory term for Latin Americans.

> R: 'The episode in the underground wasn't racism?'
>
> A5D20: 'Yes it was (they laugh).'
>
> R: 'Have you felt discriminated for being Amazigh?'
>
> A3D20: 'No. I think that in Catalonia they love Amazighs more than Arabs. I don't know if it's because we have the same situation of discrimination.'

When these discriminative factors combine, we can talk about double or triple minorisation. Another interesting case is this of an Amazigh-speaking Catalan:

> Researcher: 'Have you suffered discrimination for speaking Catalan?'
>
> A2H40: 'Yes. I went with a lad to the police station. When I arrived, I was speaking in Catalan to the policeman and he goes "but are you Catalan?". Like "you don't have the right to speak Catalan". I don't understand it. This idea that "you are a foreigner, you should speak Spanish, you don't have the right to speak Catalan". And yes, there are many cases and situations. And many people who say "don't worry, you can speak Spanish, it's not a problem". Or they immediately speak to you in Spanish when you speak Catalan. I don't know if it's paternalism, [...] but it is a kind of categorisation. Categorising a person or a collective means to exclude them. This leads to poverty, suffering...'

There are many more examples in the data of cumulative discrimination. Some of these discriminative factors - such as gender - are overtly identified and denounced by the interviewees, although most are difficult to accept and are therefore covert. The significantly diverse historical processes underwent in America and the Maghreb, respectively, can explain the differences between the two communities: Quechua historical minorisation effects tend to be covert, whereas the Amazigh community's tend to be more overt, although they claim to feel more comfortable than in Morocco, especially those with a tradition of activism:

> Researcher: 'Do you reckon Quechua is discriminated in Catalonia?'
>
> Q2H45: 'There is no discrimination between Peruvians, we are all equal. If they ask where we are from in Peru, I think they don't do in a discriminatory way. They don't care if you speak Quechua or not.'
>
> R: 'Have you received bad reactions from people when you sing in Quechua?'
>
> Q2H45: 'No, mostly good. Some mocking messages, unfortunately. You get hundreds and hundreds of emails, apart from Facebook messages… Some are bad, […] from Peruvians or Ecuadorians. They probably feel inferior or bad when they talk about it.'

> Researcher: 'What reasons did you emigrate to Catalonia for?'
>
> A6H40: '[...] Political [reasons] because I didn't feel well with the Moroccan authorities. Also society, you don't feel comfortable. For example, I do not practice Ramadan, and it's difficult to eat in public.'

In both cases, these discriminations cross borders and are brought along to host countries when emigrating. This is also the case in Catalonia, where white Peruvians from the coast discriminate against Peruvians from the central highlands (Sierra), and where the Moroccan government pays for Arabic classes and not for Amazigh classes, or does not incorporate Amazigh (nor Catalan) in its consulate services. These examples can be considered inherent discriminations particular to Quechuas and inherent discriminations particular to Amazighs.

Q5D40 gives a hint as to why other Quechuas deny there is any discrimination:

> 'They have told me about the discrimination of Coast Peruvians over Sierra Peruvians here in Catalonia. They don't invite them to their events, for example.'

A2H40, corroborated by A8D40, talks about Arabic dominance over Amazighs and Moroccan discrimination over Amazighs in Catalonia:

> A2H40: 'Morocco pays and trains a workforce of teachers of Arabic for the children of the Moroccans of Catalonia. But no Amazigh teachers.[…] I don't have anything against Arabic, but they are Arabising Amazighs here as well. […] And this is an injustice. This happens at the education level, consulate, and other levels […]'

As seen, the Amazigh community is affected by being subordinated to Arabic and Catalan/Spanish societies and at the same time being an immigrant community in Catalonia and a minoritised group in Morocco/Algeria. To this particular situation, issues like religious, migrant, social class, and racial and gender discrimination also arise. Muslim Amazigh women are an especially affected group, suffering from gender, religious, and racial discrimination.

On the other hand, the Quechua community is subordinated to both Spanish and Catalan societies, being a minority group in their countries of origin and an immigrant group in Catalonia. Intracommunity racism and discrimination from less racialised Latin Americans towards more racialised Quechuas play an important role in the Quechua minorisation, which is reproduced in the metropolitan colonial state, Spain, from which it was imported. Again, gender, migrant, and social class discriminations, though not religious, are also in play.

DISCUSSION: DOUBLE MINORISATION

We have seen the interplay of the phenomena of the mirror effect and the double minorisation in both Quechua and Amazigh communities. The mirror effect may determine the identities and sociocultural practices of Amazighs and Quechuas in very different ways. At first glance, we can appreciate that there are more cases of mirror effect among the Amazighs than among the Quechuas. The next table represents the types of participants regarding the mirror effect. Data from the surveys and the participant observations not included due to space constraints is nevertheless taken into consideration in the following data analysis.

	No mirror effect	Mirror effect
Amazighs	A5D20	A1H45 A2H40 A3D20 A4H20 A6H40 A7D40 A8D40 A9H40
Quechuas	Q1D45 Q2H45 Q3D50 Q4H50	Q5D40 Q6H50

Table 3: Participants and the mirror effect.

Amazighs who have not experienced the mirror effect tend to have nation-state identities, Moroccan and/or Spanish, and sometimes an Islamic religious identity. They also tend to have neutral/indifferent attitudes towards minority cultures and languages, which are seen as not 'useful.'

In comparison, Quechuas who have not undergone the mirror effect also tend to identify with the nation-state, and there are also cases of Latino and even Andean identities. Their indigenous identity and traits, if not rejected, tends to be folklorised and only present in private spheres and kept away from public spheres. There are many cases of self-hatred [6] and low self-esteem, intertwined with racialisation consequences.

The mirror effect prompts solidarity and shared identification between minorities, which can change one's identity. Both Amazighs and Quechuas affected by the phenomenon tend to identify themselves as Amazigh-Catalans or Quechua-Catalans. They tend to have multilingualist ideologies.[7] There are important differences regarding the tangible consequences of this ideological change. While Amazighs tend to proudly promote both Catalan and Amazigh activism, Quechuas tend to focus only on Quechua cultural–more than linguistic–activism, in a rediscovery and revaluation of their indigenous condition, which may improve the self-esteem and minimise the self-hatred. In the next paragraphs I will outline some factors that may explain the similarities and differences of the different mirror effects according to each community.

Social class and **access to Catalan** are common factors that may prevent both communities from undergoing the mirror effect. As reported, Catalan language relates to the middle class and Spanish is linked to the working class - majorly conformed by Spanish immigration (reported by A1H45, described in Pujolar, 2009:91). Quechua and Amazigh immigration tends to establish in working-class areas, where contact with Catalan-related sociocultural elements is lower. Access to Catalan language is key to experimenting the mirror effect. In fact, the language the interview was carried out in was directly related to the mirror effect: If there was some Catalan in the interview, the mirror effect was found. In A4H20's case, access to Catalan affected the different language and identity choices he and his siblings made.

[6] 'Autoodi' concept coined by the Valencian sociolinguist Rafel Ninyoles (1969).
[7] A recurrently asserted by several participants: 'all languages are equal'.

Linguistic accommodation, which was reported by many participants from both communities, is linked to the possibility of access to Catalan. Accommodation, which implies using the dominant language with individuals identified as outsiders, is majorly practiced by Catalans and is a common trait among linguistic minorities (Boix 1993; Vila and Galindo 2012). This practice creates a barrier and keeps Catalan as an intracommunity code difficult to be shared, and also otherises new speakers of Catalan and hinders their learning.

There are some factors that may explain the major proportion of mirror effect cases among the Amazighs, such as the proximity of the historico-political contexts. Catalans and Amazighs tend to perceive themselves as a stateless, occupied or minoritised nation versus the Quechua identification as an indigenous people. These common assumptions can generate synergies that are less evident to Quechuas.

Moreover, the recent Amazigh Spring movement has been raising awareness of the Amazigh identity, culture, and language in North Africa, spreading to the host countries to Amazigh diaspora, and has also raised awareness of the existence of the Amazigh people to many European societies, facilitating the mirror effect (reported by A8D40, described in Maddy-Weitzman, 2012).

On the contrary, nation-state homogenisation, Arabisation and Islamisation policies towards the Amazighs, which imply coercive changes in identity and sociocultural practices, conform a preventive factor to the mirror effect (reported by A6H40, described in El Aissati, 2001).

The factors found particular to the Quechua community are all preventive of the mirror effect. The historical colonial racialisation process, which has led to a racial complex[8] and low self-esteem, especially in front of nonracialised people, prevents Quechuas from experiencing solidarity towards Western/nonracialised minority groups. (Van Dijk, 2005, also reported by Q5D40).

Spain has been the metropolitan state for Latin American communities and also the nation-state homogenising agent for Catalonia. This common dominant matrix, rather than facilitating solidarity, puts Quechuas in a comfortable position in Catalonia, as already knowing Spanish makes learning Catalan an extra effort (argued by Q4H50). For the Amazighs, learning both Catalan and Spanish represents a similar effort (Comellas 2006:424).

Having discussed the mirror effect on each community and its common and particular factors, I will now outline the main characteristics of triple minorisation, which affects all the participants. These cumulative minorisation factors build complex forms of discrimination.

Social class, gender, religion, racialisation, and **nation-state homogenisation** represent universal factors that affect migrants and social sectors all over the world. Most Quechuas and Amazighs establish in Catalonia in the working class with all its implications, eminently related to economic difficulties. Women also suffer from discrimination and gender biases. Quechua women tend to work in the social care sector, whereas a big proportion of Amazigh women tend to be housewives. Amazigh women wearing the veil suffer from more overt discrimination (reported in A5D20, A3D20 and Q5D40).

Religion is a factor that strongly affects the Amazighs - mostly Muslims - practically avoiding the Quechuas. The Western conflict and discrimination towards Islam, which has been increasing the past years, is a source of their discrimination. There are also Amazighs with other beliefs - Atheism, Judaism, and Christianism - who at the same time may be discriminated against by Muslims (intracommunity minorisation, reported by A6H40).

[8] Concept used by some interviewees**.**

Regarding the discrimination perpetrated by the nation-state, in this case it is performed by the original nation-state and the host nation-state at the same time. For example, not having an official census of the speakers of Amazigh and Quechua because they are regarded as Moroccans, Bolivians, Algerians or Peruvians from both Catalan and Spanish authorities but also from the authorities of their countries of origin (reported by A2H40).

Some of the minorisation factors are transported from the countries of origin. This intra-community minorisation is reproduced in the diaspora: for instance, the Moroccan government funds Arabic classes in Catalonia but not Amazigh classes (reported by A6H40), and Quechuas from the coast and urban areas discriminate Quechuas from the highlands in cultural events in Catalonia (explained by Q2H45).

Finally, the already elaborated linguistic accommodation phenomenon, performed by most of the Catalan-speaking community, can be seen also as a form of discrimination, in this case from the host minority group to the migrant minority group. Treating migrants as foreign elements to be kept away from Catalan society hinders access to the social elevator that Catalan language represents together with cohesive and integrative sociocultural practices (Boix 1993; Vila and Galindo 2012). A2H40's case with the Spanish police denying his right to speak Catalan is a clear example.

CONCLUSION

In today's highly fluctuating world, with mobility playing a central role and continuously shaping identities and linguistic, social, and cultural practices, we have described and evaluated two understudied phenomena that are in interplay with this globalised and homogenisation-oriented contemporary context: the mirror effect and the double minorisation phenomenon.

The mirror effect can change linguistic and cultural practices, ideologies, attitudes, and behaviour and potentially raise solidarity and awareness among minority groups and reinforce declining and nonprestigious identities and help maintain and revitalise them. In the case of the Amazigh community, the mirror effect is more widespread than in the Quechua community, and it triggers activism towards both the community and the host-minoritised languages and cultures, whereas in the Quechua case, it triggers activism principally towards their own indigenous culture and identity.

On the other hand, the cumulative discrimination factors to migrants from minority origins hinder their mobility outcomes and lifestyle in today's globalised world. Both phenomena are interrelated, and I believe that fostering solidarity among minoritised groups and reinforcing traditional identities may reduce minorisation effects. This is exactly the point made by two participants: Perhaps the mirror effect and the double minorisation effect have moved beyond the sociolinguistic situation and the consequences of the discrimination respectively, and are more intertwined than may seem:

> Researcher: 'What do you think we can do to reverse Catalan and Amazigh discrimination?'
>
> A1H45: 'We must fight. It is up to us, we have to do something. For languages and for other things as well.'
>
> Researcher: 'You said there is discrimination towards Latin-Americans.'
>
> Q5D40: 'Not only Latin-Americans, but towards a lot of people! Towards Maghreb people even more! Especially because women are more covered, and because they have an accent. Racialised feminism is not the same as white feminism. It has all to do with discrimination. I am aware that a Black woman is more discriminated than I am. It is one of the things I have learned here.'

Following up from that, as a linguist, I have to be aware that, in order to address language loss, and since language death causes are exclusively extralinguistic, we firstly have to address the multiple discriminations and other issues that each community faces and not only revitalise languages, but also traditional cultures, identities, and ways of life, and open them to a modern, globalised world, where mobility should be an opportunity instead of a condition.

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